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Dynamical Evolutionary Psychology: Mapping the Domains of the New
Interactionist Paradigm
Douglas T. Kenrick, Jon K. Maner, Jon Butner,
Norman P. Li, and D. Vaughn Becker
Department of Psychology
Arizona State University
Mark Schaller
Department of Psychology
University of British Columbia
Dynamical systems and evolutionary theories have both been proposed as integrative
approaches to psychology. These approaches are typically applied to different sets of
questions. Dynamical systems models address the properties of psychological systems
as they emerge and change over time; evolutionary models address the specific func-
tions and contents of psychological structures. New insights can be achieved by inte-
grating these two paradigms, and we propose a framework to begin doing so. The
framework specifies a set of six evolutionarily fundamental social goals that place
predictable constraints on emergent processes within and between individuals, influ-
encing their dynamics over the short-term, and across developmental and evolution-
ary time scales. These social goals also predictably influence the dynamic emergence
and change of cultural norms. This framework has heuristic as well as integrative po-
tential, generating novel hypotheses within a number of unexplored areas at psychol-
ogy’s interface with the other biological and social sciences.
Every second-order interaction is moderated by third
order interactions, which in turn are moderated by
higher order interactions. Once we attend to interac-
tions, we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity.
(Cronbach, 1975, p. 119)
Rather than focusing exclusively on factors inside
the person or in the environment, psychology is an in-
creasingly interactionist discipline. Psychologists now
envision internal predispositions interacting with envi-
ronmental inputs to affect ongoing thoughts and feel-
ings in a continual and dynamic manner. These interac-
tions unfold over time, as factors within the individual
affect the choice and the interpretation of situations, and
as individuals change their social situations. Con-
versely, factors in the situation not only trigger individ-
ual affective and cognitive inclinations in the short run,
but over time, also change aspects of the person.
But Cronbach’s (1975) quote (earlier) expresses a
key concern about interactionism: How can a researcher
enter this ever-changing array of interactions without
getting lost in a “hall of mirrors?” If every interaction is
moderated by a higher order interaction, perhaps it is
pointless to isolate any particular factors in the person or
situation for study. Indeed, the argument that human
behavior is “too complex” for scientific study has been
advanced in various forms over the years.
Confronting Complexity: Dynamical
Systems and Evolutionary Psychology
Dynamical systems theory provides one pathway
out of the hall of mirrors. This approach is concerned
with complex multi-component systems as they
change over time. To understand the balance of pred-
ators and prey, plants and animals, or parasites and
hosts in a forest ecosystem, for example, one must
observe the system over time. One of the exciting dis-
coveries emerging from studies of complex systems
is a ubiquitous tendency towards self-organization.
Order often arises spontaneously—and sometimes
suddenly—out of initially random interactions among
components. Self-organization can occur within indi-
viduals’ minds, as when coherent knowledge struc-
tures (e.g., self-concepts) emerge from the dynamic
activation and inhibition of lower-level cognitions
(Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000; Read
& Miller, 1998). Self-organization also occurs among
groups of individuals, as in the emergence of status
hierarchies, and across populations of individuals, as
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when clusters of shared beliefs and other cultural
norms emerge from communication and influence
among those individuals (Latané, 1996).
The logic of the dynamic perspective is intrinsically
connected with the logic of evolutionary psychology
(Kenrick, Li, & Butner, in press). Both approaches are,
for example, concerned with changes emerging over
time in interconnected multi-component systems. In-
deed, evolution by natural selection may be the para-
mount example of the power of self-organization.
However, the two approaches have typically been ap-
plied to rather different questions. Dynamical systems
models address questions about patterns of order and
change within psychological and social systems (e.g.,
How do coherent self-concepts or social norms emerge
out of initially disorganized components?) Dynamical
models share with traditional cognitive psychology an
emphasis on process, with less focus on content. Thus,
they are rarely able to predict why self-concepts or so-
cial norms emerge with the one specific set of features
rather than others. An evolutionary approach, on the
other hand, is directly concerned with questions about
specific content. By specifying particular adaptive
problems bearing on the survival and reproduction of
ancestral organisms, evolutionary models yield hy-
potheses specifying that certain cognitive and behav-
ioral patterns are more likely than others to be wide-
spread within human populations.
The mutual implications of dynamical and evolu-
tionaryapproaches tocognitionandbehaviorhaveyet to
be conceptually or empirically explored within the be-
havioral sciences. In this article, we map out a general
integrative framework that may be useful in identifying
questions and generating novel hypotheses about the
dynamic structures that emerge within human minds, in
social interaction, and across human populations.
We begin by considering one key insight from evolu-
tionarypsychology:Theadaptiveproblemsfacedbyan-
cestral humans have given rise to a corresponding set of
fundamental psychological goals that guide contempo-
rary human cognition and behavior within specific do-
mains of social life. These adaptive goals have conse-
quences for social dynamics at several levels: affecting
short-term patterns, changes in cognitive structures
across individuals’ lives, and evolutionary changes in
the cognitive and behavioral features of populations.
Finally, we discuss how these processes that operate on
individuals can also have predictable consequences on
the emergent properties of the shared beliefs and social
norms that define human cultures.
The Domains and Goals of Social Life
Other people present us with multitudinous infor-
mational inputs. Some are tall, some short; some are
female, some male; some are relatives, others friends,
and still others strangers. The need to make quick, effi-
cient, and functional decisions makes it impossible to
attend equally to every piece of information. From an
evolutionary perspective, cognitive processes involve
adaptive selectivity: We attend to the information most
relevant to important domain-specific goals. And our
responses to that information are informed by heuristic
decision-rules that, in ancestral environments, would
have been functionally adaptive (i.e., facilitated repro-
ductive success).
Evolutionary reasoning—bolstered by neuro-
physiological evidence (Panksepp, 1982)—suggests a
finite set of fundamental human goals, each linked to an
adaptive problem posed by the environments in which
ancestral humans lived. What are the pre-eminent do-
mains of adaptive problems confronting humans living
in social groups? Based on several reviews of literature
related to this question (Bugental, 2000; Buss, 1999;
Fiske, 1992; Kenrick et al., in press), we identify six key
domains of social life associated with corresponding
fundamental goals. The satisfaction of each goal serves
the ultimate function of passing on one’s genes to future
generations, and does so by facilitating one or more of
the following outcomes: increasing one’s own repro-
ductive life-span; maximizing the number of productive
mating opportunities; or ensuring that one’s offspring
reach reproductive age themselves. The goals are:
(1) Self-protection. A necessary precondition to
successful reproduction is to stay alive and healthy.
This requires psychological mechanisms that motivate
vigilant avoidance of individuals who pose threats to
one’s health. The self-protective goal is associated with
emotions that motivate avoidant behaviors (e.g., fear,
disgust), and promote selective attention to threat-rele-
vant features of others (e.g., large outgroup males).
(2) Coalition formation. Health and reproductive
fitness is promoted not only by the avoidance of
threats, but also by building coalitional bonds to pro-
mote cooperation and mutual assistance in times of
need. This coalitional goal may be linked to emotions
(such as empathy) that motivate pro-social behavior
and may promote selective attention to information
(such as similarity or past evidence of reciprocity) indi-
cating which other people are good bets for the expen-
diture of assistance.
(3) Status-seeking. For both sexes, there are adap-
tive advantages to gaining and maintaining social sta-
tus, including greater access to material resources and
extended social alliances. Because females use male
status as a cue for mate selection, males are more likely
to be concerned with possible loss of status. This goal
is likely to promote selective attention to size, sex, and
other indicators of relative social status (some of which
may be learned and culture-specific).
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(4) Mate choice. Access to viable mates is essential
to reproductive success; so individuals are likely to se-
lectively attend to features connoting reproductive via-
bility. Because of inherent differences in amount and
type of parental investment, males and females are
likely to attend to somewhat distinct sets of features in
the other sex. For instance, women may attend more to
indicators of status and overall genetic fitness, and men
to age and other indicators of fertility.
(5) Relationship maintenance. Because human in-
fants are helpless and slow to develop, their survival is
enhanced by the presence and support of both parents.
Thus, long-term cooperative mating relationships
would have been adaptive. This goal may direct atten-
tion to information relevant to decisions about relation-
ship maintenance, including attractiveness of same-sex
interlopers on the social horizon and the ratio of fe-
males to males in the local mating pool.
(6) Offspring Care. Because parental care is criti-
cal to offspring survival, it is an essential goal itself.
The need for parental care is not constant across time
or context; so individuals are likely to selectively at-
tend to information that inform decisions about the
devotion of resources to specific offspring. These in-
clude the presence of other offspring, age of off-
spring, care provided by other kin, and immediate
dangers to offspring.
Each of these goals is also associated with a specific
social geometry that constrains the nature of interper-
sonal interactions. Self-protective goals lead to the
emergence of mutually exclusive social categories that
cleave the world according to distinctions between in-
dividuals who are in our group and those who are not.
Cooperation goals lead to the emergence of overlap-
ping circles of friends and relatives. Status-seeking
goals demand the emergence of hierarchical arrange-
ments. Mating relationship goals demand interactions
at the dyadic level; and so on (see Figure 1; for elabora-
tion, see Kenrick et al., in press).
Thus, the geometries of social life, which govern in-
teraction and social influence—and so are fundamental
to the dynamic emergence of cultural norms and other
aspects of socially-shared cognition (Latané &
L’Herrou, 1996)—are themselves constrained by the
psychological products of human evolutionary history.
This hints at just one of the useful implications that can
arise when considering the implications of evolution-
ary psychology on the predictions generated by dy-
namical systems models. Some of these implications
are explored more fully by Kenrick et al. (in press).
Here, we turn our attention to a broader set of implica-
tions that appear when considering the influence of
evolutionarily based goals on the dynamic emergence
of social phenomena.
An Organizing Framework For
Dynamical Evolutionary Psychological
Questions
Table 1 presents a conceptual framework for orga-
nizing the questions that can be addressed by an
evolutionarily informed dynamical social psychology.
One dimension of the table refers to the timeframe
of the dynamic process. Some dynamic processes oc-
cur over short time spans—as patterns emerge within
moment-to-moment and hour-to-hour thoughts, feel-
ings, and social behaviors. Dynamic processes also
continue to unfold over the course of individuals’ lives,
and so guide development and change in personality,
social cognition, and social interactions throughout the
lifespan. Finally, dynamic processes operate on popu-
lations over a much longer, evolutionary timeframe,
and so have influenced the nature and organization of
cognitive and behavioral mechanisms common across
human populations.
Dynamic evolutionary questions can be divided fur-
ther into those dealing specifically with interactions
among components inside the organism (e.g., the dy-
namic relations between attention, thought, and com-
peting functional motivations), and those that involve
interactions between organisms (e.g., the emergence of
349
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Figure 1. Different decision rules for each social problem do-
main lead to the emergence of different social geometries (based
on Kenrick, Li, & Butner, in press).
3
group norms). This distinction comprises the second
dimension of this conceptual framework, yielding a
scheme in which research questions can be classified
into one of six conceptual categories.
Of course, moment-to-moment interactions are nec-
essary parts of the never-ending dynamic story of hu-
man developmental change, and of evolutionary
change across time. And, in social species, there is an
intrinsic connection between intra-individual dynam-
ics and the dynamic interactions between individuals.
Hence, the processes identified within each category
are necessarily related to processes identified within
other categories as well. The general framework is nev-
ertheless useful for framing a set of questions, and sug-
gesting a set of novel hypotheses, about the psycholog-
ical structures that emerge dynamically within
different domains of social life.
Short-term Interactions of
Components Within The Person
In any given moment, the brain processes millions
of neural inputs regarding temperature, light, smell,
bodily position, respiration, and so on. Conscious ex-
perience represents a patterned organization of sensa-
tion, attention, perception, categorization, memory, af-
fect, and plans for behavioral action. There have been a
number of dynamical analyses of psychological phe-
nomena at the individual level. For example, Nowak et
al. (2000) examined how self-organization of beliefs,
attitudes, and memories gives rise to coordinated
change, differentiation, and global coherence in one’s
self-concept. From an evolutionary dynamic perspec-
tive, one might ask: In what ways are self-concepts and
other emergent knowledge structures constrained? Are
some types of information more likely than others to
define these structures?
An evolutionary perspective inclines one to ask how
the various components of the individual are differen-
tially organized to meet different adaptive goals. Dy-
namically constructed knowledge structures pertaining
to the social world may be drawn to a limited number
of attractor states that correspond to fundamental
adaptive goals. For instance, stereotypic impressions
of groups often coalesce around traits connoting either
friendliness or competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, &
Xu, in press)—dimensions relevant to self-protection,
coalition-building, and status-seeking goals. Personal-
ity traits are also perceptually organized in ways that
correspond to specific goals linked to the adaptive
problems identified earlier (e.g., Read, Jones, &
Miller, 1990; Roberts & Robins, 2000). The same con-
straints on content may apply to the self-concept. The
traits likely to define self-concepts most strongly—
those most accessible and subjectively important—are
likely to be those corresponding to evolutionarily fun-
damental goals.
The defining contents of knowledge structures are,
of course, in constant flux. Evidence bearing on the dy-
namic activation-and-inhibition processes of human
cognition suggests a sort of winner-take-all state of
psychological affairs, in which only one executive sys-
tem predominates at a given time (Martindale, 1991).
This implies that the activation of one adaptive motiva-
tional system inhibits others, with important conse-
quences for the specific knowledge structure activated
at any given time. For example, a perceived physical
threat will activate a self-protective goal, leading
threat-relevant features of self and other (e.g., familiar-
ity, physical strength) to become especially salient,
while features pertaining to potential mating opportu-
nities fade into the background. On the other hand, if a
mating goal is activated, mating-relevant features of
self and other (e.g., physical attractiveness) become sa-
lient, while self-protection related information dimin-
ishes in import.
An evolutionary perspective implies that some do-
main-specific goals will take priority over others. For
example, one failure of self-protection has greater
functional consequences than one failure in mate-seek-
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Table 1. A Framework for Organizing Questions Arising From a Dynamical Evolutionary Psychology.
Time Frame
Units Short-term Developmental Evolutionary
Within Person How do coherent psychological
structures emerge from the dynamic
interaction of affective and cognitive
processes?
Example: Activating self-protection vs.
mating motive re-organizes attentional
and perceptual processes.
How does the internal organization of
an individual’s cognitions, traits, and
other characteristics change over the
lifespan?
Example: Relationship between
aggressive behavior and testosterone
levels changes at puberty.
How do constellations or syndromes of
traits co-evolve over generations?
Example: Inherent pattern linking
female reproductive physiology,
parenting behavior, and attitudes about
casual sex.
Between People How do the interactions between
individuals in interconnected networks
self-organize into group level patterns?
Example: Mutual cooperation or
conflict in a social dilemma situation.
How do social groups organize and
re-organize themselves over the
life-spans of the individuals involved?
Example: Dynamics between sexes
change at puberty.
How does the local population of types
mutually constrain one another?
Example: Physical and behavioral
characteristics of males co-evolve with
those of females.
4
ing (a woman who foregoes a mating opportunity to
save herself from bodily harm will live to see other
mating opportunities, but the reverse may not be true).
These examples illustrate how intra-person dynamics
are intrinsically linked to inter-personal dynamics.
Short-term Interactions Between
Individuals
Individual decisions have implications for social be-
haviors, which in turn lead to dynamic processes at the
inter-personal level (Latané, 1996; Nowak, Szamrej, &
Latané, 1990). These interpersonal interactions are like-
wise constrained by evolutionarily based goals.
These goals are not insensitive to the environment.
From an evolutionary perspective, they can be con-
ceived of as decision rules, or if-then statements, re-
sponsive to inputs from other individuals with whom
one interacts (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Kenrick et al.,
in press). We conducted a series of spatial simulations
to examine implications of individual adaptive deci-
sion rules at the dynamic level (Kenrick et al., in press).
One series explored how individual differences in deci-
sion rules for cooperation versus competition affected
community level outcomes. A few individuals with un-
usual decision rules (such as a very low threshold for
aggression) could change outcomes for whole commu-
nities, depending on the initial random distribution of
neighbors (see Figure 2).
A second series of simulations explored the mutual
impact of mating decision rules, using a two-layer ge-
ometry similar to that for mate choice depicted in Fig-
ure 1. A given female’s decision rule for sexually re-
stricted or unrestricted behavior was keyed to the
behaviors of males in her immediate vicinity. Con-
versely, males’ decision rules were keyed to the behav-
iors of contiguous females. Consistent with empirical
data and theory, females’ decision rules were assumed
to lean somewhat toward a restricted mating strategy,
preferring this option unless an overwhelming major-
ity of local males were unrestricted. Males, on the
other hand, were assumed to lean slightly toward an
unrestricted strategy, but to behave in a restricted man-
ner if a majority of local females did so. The mutual
feedback between men and women—coupled with the
different decision rules employed by each sex—had
nonlinear consequences on the actual mating decisions
made by the individuals within this simulated commu-
nity. Using normal decision rules, both men and
women converged into communities that were pre-
dominantly restricted; whereas relatively small
changes in the rules adopted by either sex had rather
larger consequences at the community level. For exam-
ple, if females use typically “male” rather than “fe-
male” decision rules, the same initial communities
tend to converge into clusters of individuals acting
mostly in an unrestricted manner.
These simulations help clarify the difference be-
tween underlying traits and overt behavioral manifesta-
tions. In the simulations, males’ behavior varied de-
pending on females’ decision-rules, even though the
males’ underlying dispositions did not change. Such
simulations demonstrate how different local ecologies
may induce individuals with a given trait to act very dif-
ferently, even though their underlying traits do not vary.
For a real world parallel, homosexual and heterosexual
males are, in most ways, very similar in mating prefer-
ences, but homosexual males are strikingly more unre-
stricted than heterosexuals (Bell & Weinberg, 1978;
Kenrick, Keefe, Bryan, Barr, & Brown, 1995). This dif-
351
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Figure 2. The neighborhood at the left depicts individuals acting
either aggressively (dark) or peacefully (white). If all individuals
attempt to match the majority of their neighbors, this neighbor-
hood will self-organize into a totally peaceful neighborhood (as
shown at the right top). If some individuals have very low thresh-
olds for aggression (as marked), this can change outcomes for the
whole neighborhood, depending on their location and random
variations in their neighbors’behaviors (based on Kenrick, Li, &
Butner, 2001). In these examples, the marked individuals will act
aggressively if any of their neighbors were hostile on the previ-
ous round of interaction. In B, one aggressive individual radi-
cally changes the outcome for the whole community. In C, a sin-
gle low threshold individual has no impact on the eventual
outcome, but in combination with the other low-threshold indi-
viduals, this individual completely reverses the outcome for the
neighborhood as a whole (the contingency involving this individ-
ual’s impact demonstrates the critical importance of initial con-
ditions in complex systems).
5
ference may reflect the dynamic implications of slightly
different local ecologies, rather than an underlying dif-
ference in decision-rules for restricted behavior. If het-
erosexual males’ intended partners used the same deci-
sion-rules as they do, predominantly unrestricted
communities would likely be much more frequent.
Similar discontinuities between individual predis-
positions and overt behaviors are likely in other funda-
mental domains of social life. The discovery of these
non-obvious outcomes demands attention to the dy-
namic interactions between individuals, and to the spe-
cific social geometries that govern their interactions
within the different domains.
Specific hypotheses might be deduced and tested in
a variety of ways. Empirical data from individuals can
provide necessary information about the decision crite-
ria for different sorts of interactions within different
types of social geometries. This information about in-
dividual decision rules can be used to set the parame-
ters of simulations designed to model dynamic impli-
cations over time. These models may reveal further
non-obvious consequences resulting from the dynamic
interplay of decision rules. Those results can then be
tested empirically against sociometric data and results
of new experiments.
Within-Person Dynamics Over The
Life Course
Patterns of individual cognition, affect, and behavior
can change over the life course. Some of these changes
mayberelativelysudden—thesortofdramaticdisconti-
nuity that suggests nonlinear dynamic interactions
within the individual. Evolutionary biologists some-
times view developmental processes through the lens of
a life history—a genetically organized plan for allocat-
ing energy to survival, growth, and reproduction
(Kenrick&Keefe,1992).Humanlifehistoriesarepunc-
tuatedbyseveral substantialdiscontinuities.Lifebegins
with a lengthy period of somatic effort, which ends in
dramatic physiological, cognitive, and affective
changes at puberty. Then, a large increase in production
of reproductive hormones is accompanied by increases
inattention to theoppositesex,concernwithsocialcom-
parison within sex, increased probabilities of risk-tak-
ing behaviors, and so on. For females, there is another
disjunctive change at menopause, when changes in hor-
mone production accompany dramatic physical, cogni-
tive, and affective changes.
Individuals sometimes undergo other sudden psy-
chological changes—in attitudes and values—in con-
cert with changes in the social environment (e.g., dis-
rupted mating relationship; entry into a new circle of
friends). These sudden changes may be most likely to
occur on attitudes and values most important to indi-
viduals’ self-concepts (Latané & Nowak, 1994). A dy-
namical approach to development suggests that indi-
viduals are drawn toward different psychological at-
tractor states at different points in the lifespan; and the
logic of evolutionary theory further suggests that these
states are likely to correspond to the fundamental func-
tional goals of social life.
Studiesofother species reveal thepossibilityofalter-
native strategies for solving the same adaptive problem
at significant stages in an organism’s life history. For ex-
ample, some male salmon develop to full size and battle
with one another for reproductive access to females;
others develop very large testes within much smaller
bodies, hide in the gravel near nesting pairs, and dart in
to release their own sperm when the female releases her
eggs (Gould & Gould, 1989). The dynamics of human
development may lead to parallel alternative tracks
through the evolutionarily meaningful domains of hu-
man life. For instance, research on social dilemmas sug-
gests that some individuals adopt a chronically coopera-
tive strategy, whereas others adopt a habitually
competitive style (VanLange, DeBruin, Otten, &
Joireman, 1997). Similarly, there are chronic individual
differences in the probability of adopting a restricted or
unrestricted mating strategy (Gangestad & Simpson,
2000). The adoption of one strategy versus another may
result from the nonlinear dynamical interplay of exist-
ing traits (physical features, temperament, etc.). Slight
developmental changes in these underlying traits and
cognitionsmay tip thebalance towardoneofseveraldis-
tinct, and self-maintaining, behavioral trajectories.
These self-maintaining trajectories can be conceived, in
dynamic terms, as developmental attractor states.
Pursuing this line of reasoning can generate novel
research questions. How might personality and
self-concept become dynamically re-organized as a
consequence of changes in some single within-person
component (e.g., change in sex drive)? How might
these changes be constrained by the evolutionary goals
most relevant to particular stages in human life histo-
ries (e.g., mate choice vs. offspring care)? How do
changes in the internal organization of traits bearing on
one social domain (such as status-seeking or
mate-choice) connect dynamically to changes in traits
relevant to other domains (such as self-protection or
coalition formation)?
Between-Person Dynamics Over the
Life Course
Life-history strategies, with their associated inter-
nal organization of psychological components and ex-
ternal organization of morphology, are intrinsically
connected to social dynamics. Consider the Nassau
grouper. In this species, all young individuals are fe-
males who join harems controlled by a large territorial
male. When the male dies, the largest female goes
through a series of hormonal and morphological
changes and becomes a male (Warner, 1984). Thus, the
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self-organization of traits in this species is, in a dra-
matic way, influenced by events in the local social en-
vironment, and in turn exerts a reciprocal influence on
other individuals in that environment. Similarly, inter-
actions within the local social environment may influ-
ence the internal psychological make-up of individuals
within that environment, and lead to developmental ef-
fects that have additional consequences for other peo-
ple in the local social network. One example may be
provided by research revealing effects of family dy-
namics on timing of pubertal maturation in girls (Ellis,
McFadyen-Ketchum, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999).
Over the lifespan, there are likely to be unique dy-
namic consequences associated with the different sorts
of interpersonal interactions that define the various do-
mains of social life. Some of these consequences may
reflect particular dynamic patterns of behavior relevant
to the specific social geometries associated with each
domain. Within coalition networks, cooperative cycles
of behavior may become deeply entrained among some
individuals, whereas others—those who are excluded
from coalitions for whatever reason—may adopt differ-
ent, less cooperative strategies to gain access to valued
resources. These group dynamics, once in place, can re-
sist the influence of single individuals and so can be re-
markably difficult to change (Plous, 1985). There are
differentdynamicconsequencesassociatedwithmating
relationships.When individuals forge long-termmating
relationships, they essentially remove themselves from
the pool of available mates. This can affect factors
linked to the social geography of mate-choice (e.g., sex
ratio), which have substantial influences on others’mat-
ing decisions (Guttentag & Secord, 1983). Even small
changes in these parameters can have substantial ef-
fects.Hence,one individual’sdecision toenteror leavea
mating relationship can have unanticipated conse-
quenceson thebehaviorofmanyotherswithin thesocial
environment (e.g., leading others to enter or exit mating
relationships, in turn influencing the trajectory of still
other peoples’ life histories).
Within-Person Dynamics over the
Evolutionary Time Course
Social and personality psychologists customarily
consider the events that take place from moment to mo-
ment in individuals’ lives, and are also accustomed to
inquiry into the developmental changes that occur over
the course of individuals’ lives. Psychologists are less
likely to inquire into the evolutionary changes that oc-
cur in biological populations over tens of thousands of
years. Nevertheless, informed speculations about hu-
man evolutionary history can help generate novel in-
sights about contemporary psychological processes. In
this spirit, it is worth speculating about the effects that
within-person dynamics might have had on the evolu-
tion of human populations, and the ways in which
those dynamics can be constrained by the existence of
fundamental goals.
For a given organism attempting to make its way in
the world, some suites of characteristics will mesh
better than others. Genes (and their phenotypic expres-
sions) are selected if they are compatible with the col-
lection of other genes making up prototypical individu-
als in the local population. Consider the domain of
parental care. Male and female mammals have evolved
different sets of inter-linked characteristics. A female
mammal’s reproductive physiology, her approach to
choosing a mate, and her parenting behavior all tie to-
gether. Females can carry fetuses and nurse them after
birth; males can not. Associated with these behaviors
are hormonal differences. Females produce oxytocin
and progesterone, which influence not only physical
capacities—such as milk production—but also
parenting behaviors (Zeifman & Hazan, 1997). Males
produce fewer of these hormones, but more testoster-
one, which is associated with another interlinked com-
plex of bodily changes and behaviors, including en-
larged upper body muscles, deeper voices, and greater
inclinations toward aggressive competition (Mazur &
Booth, 1998).
This example illustrates processes relevant to one
particular fundamental domain of social life. Other such
co-evolutionary processes are likely to have occurred
within the other domains. In the status domain, for ex-
ample, individual differences in testosterone levels and
physical size are dynamically linked to dominant and
aggressive behavioral inclinations in an evolutionarily
adaptive way (Mazur & Booth, 1998). By inquiring into
the processes unique to each domain, a richer under-
standing of human evolutionary history is likely to
emerge, and along with it, a richer set of hypotheses
about contemporary cognition and social behavior.
Between-Person Dynamics over the
Evolutionary Time Course
Over generations, natural selection shapes organ-
isms with sets of characteristics that promote survival
within the dynamic context of other organisms they are
likely to encounter. Thus, co-evolutionary processes
often link the evolution of one class of organisms to the
evolution of other classes of organisms. A simple ex-
ample involving multiple species is the co-evolution of
parasites and hosts. Similar co-evolutionary processes
can occur within one species, as in the mutual con-
straints provided by female and male behavioral ten-
dencies. Similarly, psychological mechanisms related
to cheating and cheater-detection, or to aggression and
fear may have evolved in dynamic tandem. The evolu-
tion of communication systems provides a clear exam-
ple. For an emotional expression of anger to function
as a warning, the communicator must have the capacity
to transmit the appropriate cues, and the intended re-
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cipient must have the capacity to receive and interpret
those cues.
It will be useful to consider how human interper-
sonal behavior—driven by the desire to satisfy specific
goals in specific domains—constrained the co-evolu-
tion of cognitive mechanisms and behavioral tenden-
cies. To do so in a rigorous way demands that we place
our inquiries into human social cognition within the
larger tradition of inquiry into the evolutionary histo-
ries of other social species. For example, behavioral
ecologists have explored questions about whether large
brain size among primates is associated with living in
large social groups, and whether sex differences in
physical size are related to a species’ mating arrange-
ments (e.g., Dixson, 1999; Dunbar, 1993). Research on
dynamics in the different domains of human social life
can be made richer by this comparative perspective,
and psychologists are in a unique position to raise new
cross-disciplinary questions yet to be considered by re-
searchers focused on other species.
Additional Implications: Evolutionary
Influences on the Dynamic Emergence
of Culture
Thus far, we have discussed how adaptive goals
conspire with dynamical processes to shape the pat-
terns and structures of human social cognition and be-
havior. There are psychological implications at the so-
ciological level—as evolved decision-rules are
intrinsically linked to the patterns and structures of hu-
man culture. The very existence of culture—so-
cially-shared belief systems and norms—depends cru-
cially on the dynamic social influence processes
precipitated by interpersonal communication across
social landscapes (Harton & Bourgeois, in press;
Latané, 1996). Processes of interpersonal communica-
tion—decisions about what to say and how to say it—
are influenced by a variety of motives and goals. Thus,
the specific features and contents of emergent cultural
norms are inevitably influenced by the same goals
(Schaller & Conway, 1999, 2001). If the goals that
most govern individuals’ cognitions and decision-rules
are those pertaining to essential adaptive problems,
then those same goals are likely to affect the dynamical
processes through which cultural norms emerge and
change over time (c.f., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
On this theme, Krebs and Janicki (in press) describe
the ways in which moral norms within cultures may
have emerged as solutions to specific adaptive prob-
lems. This evolutionary analysis of moral norms is con-
sistent with Haidt’s (2001) analysis of moral reasoning,
whichsuggests that judgmentsofmoralitymaybebased
on evolved intuitive preferences rather than on rational
analysis. These evolutionary analyses of moral norms
could be enriched by a consideration of the dynamical
processes through which interacting individuals influ-
ence each other. Other theoretical analyses—abetted by
computer simulations—have focused more explicitly
on the ways in which emerging cultural norms depend
on the interpersonal dynamics of social influence
(Axelrod,1986;Kenricketal., inpress).Resultsof these
simulations reveal that particular cultural norms
emerge,whileothersdonot,dependingonadynamic in-
terplay of different individuals’ decision rules—rules
rooted inevolutionarilybasicconcernswithself-protec-
tion, coalition-formation, and mate-selection.
These promising conceptual analyses suggest that a
dynamical evolutionary perspective may offer a rich
source of answers to important questions about the ori-
gins, persistence, and change of human cultures. For
instance: Why do some beliefs spread quickly and
widely throughout a human population—and so be-
come cultural norms—while others do not? An evolu-
tionary perspective suggests that those beliefs most
pertinent to fundamental adaptive problems are most
likely to become normative, while those that are less
pertinent may remain merely idiosyncratic. Empirical
inquiry into the transmission of “urban legends” re-
veals results consistent with this evolutionary analysis.
For example, legends arousing greater disgust (and so
immediately relevant to protection against disease) are
more likely to be communicated between individuals,
and so ultimately are more likely to become part of a
cultural mythology (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001).
Another promising lead is provided by research into
the emergence of socially shared stereotypes. Exam-
ining dynamic processes through which individual
goals and interpersonal communication shape shared
stereotypic beliefs, Schaller and Conway (1999) found
that these effects occurred more strongly on beliefs
pertaining to aggression than on beliefs pertaining to
intelligence. This asymmetry is consistent with a con-
sideration of evolved function, as aggression is more
critically related to the fundamental adaptive problems
of self-protection arising in intergroup contexts. An-
other set of studies (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk,
2002) revealed that, in general, those traits most likely
to be talked about in interpersonal contexts are also
most likely to persist in the culturally-shared stereo-
types of prominent ethnic groups. These results beg the
question of why some traits are more communicable
than others. One set of testable possibilities is provided
by the evolutionary approach: Those traits that most
clearly convey information related to essential adaptive
problems and social goals (self-protection, coali-
tion-formation, mate-selection, etc.) are most likely to
comprise the contents of interpersonal communica-
tions, and so are most likely to define the emergent
contents of socially-shared stereotypes that persist in a
culture across time.
These are just a few examples of the ways in which
evolutionary goals may influence the dynamics of in-
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terpersonal communication and, ultimately, the con-
tents of cultural norms. By more fully exploring the
ways in which evolutionary goals influence the inter-
personal communication of the many beliefs and be-
haviors that define cultures, we may arrive at a more
fully informed understanding of the evolutionary and
psychological foundations of culture itself.
Conclusion: Out of the Hall of Mirrors
and Into the Map Room
Social processes involve a continual dynamic inter-
action between individual cognition and the social and
physical environment. These interactions are, at first
blush, as overwhelming and confusing as a hall of mir-
rors is toayoungchild lost inanamusementpark.Todis-
cern pattern and organization within this bewildering
complexity,abroad integrativeperspective isessential.
Dynamical systems theory provides one tool to help
us search for those patterns. Dynamical models have
revealed the ubiquity of self-organization in nature,
and uncovered analogous patterns in systems as widely
ranging as genes, neurons, human neighborhoods, and
economic markets. What an evolutionary analysis adds
to the dynamic perspective is a focus on content. By fo-
cusing on adaptive content, we should be able to make
more specific predictions about which self-organizing
structures and patterns will emerge within human
minds and across social landscapes. This focus on con-
tent can add useful predictive boundaries on the appli-
cation of familiar dynamic models to psychological
phenomena. The most interesting and important pat-
terns that emerge from dynamic interactions within
and between individuals are likely to be those emerg-
ing within the evolutionarily fundamental domains of
social life. An integrated dynamical evolutionary psy-
chology can offer an especially powerful set of concep-
tual insights. These insights can help us deduce the
psychological and cultural implications of an intrinsi-
cally dynamic natural world where genes interact con-
tinually and bidirectionally with other genes, neurons
interact with other neurons, cognitive mechanisms in-
teract with affective mechanisms, predators interact
with prey, and so on.
We have focused primarily on processes of self-or-
ganization and emergent coherence to illustrate this as-
sertion, but the same assertion is likely to apply also to
other prototypic phenomena associated with dynami-
cal systems, such as cusp catastrophes. It is perhaps no
mere coincidence that Tesser and Achee (1994) used
the conflict between mating and social pressure to il-
lustrate the relevance of the cusp model to social be-
havior, and that Zeeman (1976) used the conflict be-
tween anger and fear in a self-protection situation.
The map we have outlined here for an evolutionary
dynamical psychology is both speculative and incom-
plete. In cartographic terms, it is an initial sketch of a
possible coastline, with little detail of what lies within.
There are hints here about where to find good inlets,
but the largest expanse of potential discoveries lies
ahead. What is exciting about this sketchy map is that it
promises a theoretical continent that invites multi-dis-
ciplinary exploration. The realm of dynamical evolu-
tionary psychology has the potential to encompass and
unite all the local terrain already explored by psycholo-
gists, anthropologists, ethologists, and other behav-
ioral researchers.
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